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Abstract 
This paper uses a unique panel dataset on firm-level corruption. It contains quantitative 
information on bribe payments by a sample of formal and informal Vietnamese firms. 
We show that bribe incidence is highly associated with firm-level differences in  
(i) visibility, (ii) sunk costs, (iii) ability to pay, and (iv) level of interaction with public 
officials. Moreover, when informal firms become formal the probability of paying 
bribes increases. Becoming formal is also associated with a revenue growth premium 
that is not driven by self-selection of well-performing firms. On average, this premium 
outweighs the additional bribe cost of formalization. Formalization embodies net 
benefits in spite of the growth hampering effects of bribes  
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1 Introduction 
The most recent Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey for Vietnam (ICA 2005) 
suggests that two-thirds of firms incur informal payments as part of running their 
business. Moreover, 79 per cent are expected to give ‘gifts’ in meetings with tax 
officials and 40 per cent feel it necessary to pay bribes in order to secure government 
contracts. The Provincial Competitiveness Index (Malesky 2008) confirms that bribes to 
public officials remain a major challenge for firms in Vietnam when doing business. 
Both the frequency and size of bribes have remained at a relatively high level despite 
recent comprehensive public administration reforms aimed at reducing corruption.1 
 
This paper studies bribe incidence in a sample of 1,661 small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in 10 provinces in Vietnam. Our sample includes firm which operate 
with a formal business registration licence as well as firms (informal) without such a 
license. We show that bribe incidence is highly associated with firm-level differences in 
(i) visibility, (ii) sunk costs, (iii) ability to pay, and (iv) the level of interaction with 
public officials. It also appears that formal registration is positively correlated with 
bribe incidence. This suggests that ‘visibility’ dominates the ‘bribes-to-hide’ effect. 
Using the panel dimension of our data, we move on to disentangling the causal 
relationship between bribe incidence and formality, applying a double difference 
methodology. It emerges that moving from being an informal to a formal firm strongly 
influences bribe incidence, even when controlling for levels and changes in firm 
performance. We also find that bribe payments and informality have a negative effect 
on firm performance, and that the benefit (in real revenue growth) from obtaining a 
business registration license on average outweighs the additional bribe cost of becoming 
formal. Since this positive registration effect is not driven by self-selection of well-
performing firms into formality, we conclude that formalization is beneficial in spite of 
the negative effect from increased bribes.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and 
sets up the analytical framework. Descriptive statistics on bribes and the explanatory 
variables are also provided. Section 3 presents econometric results, and conclusions 
follow in Section 4. 
2 Data and analytical framework  
2.1 Data  
The two SME surveys on which we rely in this paper were conducted in 2005 and 
2007.2 Both surveys covered around 2,600 enterprises in 10 provinces (Ho Chi Minh 
                                                 
1 The public administration reform included (i) administrative simplification of procedures and 
regulations, and (ii) an increase in salaries and quality of civil servants. 
2 The World Bank SME Department currently operates with three groups of SMEs: micro-, small-, and 
medium-scale firms. Micro-enterprises have between 1 and 10 employees, small-scale enterprises 
between 11 and 50 employees, and medium-size enterprises between 51 and 300 employees. These 
definitions are broadly accepted by the Vietnamese Government (see government decree 
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City (HCMC), Ha Noi and Hai Phong, Long An, Ha Tay, Quang Nam, Phu Tho, Nghe 
An, Khanh Hoa and Lam Dong). In both years and all areas covered by the surveys, 
samples were stratified by ownership form to ensure that all types of non-state 
enterprises, including both officially registered (with a business registration licence) 
formal household, private, co-operative, limited liability and joint stock enterprises and 
non-official (informal) household firms, were represented. For reasons of 
implementation, the surveys were confined to specific areas in each province/city. 
Subsequently, stratified random samples were drawn from a consolidated list of formal 
enterprises and an on-site random selection of informal firms.3 While the sampling was 
adjusted over time to accommodate the rapidly changing business environment in 
Vietnam, other aspects, including the questionnaires, were maintained virtually 
identical.4 After data cleaning and checking consistency of time-invariant variables 
between the two survey rounds we were left with a balanced panel of 1,661 firm 
observations in each year. It is especially lack of financial accounts that reduced the 
number of observations.5  
2.2 Informal payments  
Before turning to our analytical framework and description of variables associated with 
the incidence of informal payments, we briefly describe our main variable of interest; 
i.e., bribe incidence. Table 1 shows the number of enterprises which paid bribes in 2005 
and 2007. Some 37 per cent of firms provided an informal payment in 2005, a share 
which fell to 23 per cent in 2007. Moreover, significant variation in bribe payments is 
observed across firms over time. Only 38 per cent of the bribe paying firms and 14 per 
cent of the entire sample provided bribes in both periods under consideration. Also 
noticeable is that 15 per cent of the 1,048 firms which did not pay bribes in 2005 
provided an informal payment in 2007. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
No. 90/2001/CP-ND on ‘Supporting for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises’). In what 
follows, we apply these definitions. 
3 Appropriate weights for formal household (HH) firms are difficult to obtain as the 2007 Establishment 
Census is yet to be finalized. The household business sector has experienced enormous changes during 
the period under study, and it is not reliable to use the establishment census from 2002 (GSO 2004) to 
generate appropriate weights. Moreover, the establishment census covers only registered individual 
household business establishments, which have a business licence issued by a district business register 
office. The non-registered (informal) household firms in our sample have not obtained such a license and 
are therefore not well covered in official census statistics. Since no reliable HH firm population 
information exists for 2005 and 2007, we find it most appropriate to report unweighted estimates in the 
analysis.  
4 Additional details on the surveys and sampling procedures can be found at the following website: 
www.econ.ku.dk/rand. 
5 The two surveys cover financial accounts information for 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
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Table 1: Bribe incidence overview 
    2007   
    No Yes Total 
20
05
 No 
892 (85) 156 (15) 1,048 
(70)  (40)  (63) 
Yes 
383 (62) 230 (38) 613 
(30)  (60)  (37) 
  Total 1,275 (77) 386 (23) 1,661 
Note: Number of enterprises (percentage in parenthesis). 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009). 
 
Enterprise owners and managers were asked about the main purpose for paying bribes. 
Figure 1 shows that 30 per cent of firms provided informal payments to get easier 
access to public services. Around 21 per cent pay informally to deal with taxes and tax 
collectors; whereas 16 per cent give informal payments in order to get favourable 
conditions in a bid for a government contract. Finally, firms were asked to provide 
information on the size of the informal payment. In Table 2 we have linked this 
information to the purpose of bribes and the size distribution of firms. Bribes paid in 
order to gain government contracts are on average the largest as measured relative to 
firm revenues. 
 
Figure 1: Purpose of informal payment 
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Table 2: Average size of informal payments 
   Bribe amount Per cent of bribes paid 
  Obs. (Per cent of total revenues) by medium/large firms 
To get connected to public services 298 0.30 10 
To get licenses and permits 43 0.56 7 
To deal with tax and tax collectors 213 0.74 10 
To gain government contracts 155 1.09 15 
To deal with customs 23 0.33 61 
Other reasons 266 0.38 0 
Total 998 0.55 13 
Source: Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009). 
 
2.3 Analytical framework and determinants 
Our analytical framework to study the incidence and level of bribes is based on Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993, 1994), also adopted by Svensson (2003), and Fisman and Svensson 
(2007). Moreover, the recent literature on firm-level determinants of informality (Dabla-
Norris et al. 2008; McKenzie and Sakho 2010) helped identify the empirical 
specifications of the link between bribe incidence and firm informality.  
 
We start out in a situation where the firm with some probability faces a public official, 
who extracts bribes that need to be paid for the business to run smoothly. The corrupt 
public official may take actions that can either benefit or harm the firm. The beneficial 
action might be a lax attitude towards rules and regulations. That is, a corrupt public 
official is ready to work the system in favour of the firm so it obtains information, gets 
business orders, and remains informal, resulting in increased firm profit (‘speed-money’ 
argument).6 The harmful actions, on the other hand, stem from a discretionary power to 
harass the firm, which may lead to extra costs and even firm closure. The threat of 
harassment implies that a corrupt official has some leverage in extracting bribes. 
 
If the corrupt official has discretionary power in implementing, executing, and 
enforcing rules relevant to firms doing business, this will affect the threat point in the 
negotiation between the public official and the firm. For example, a firm with full 
control rights can avoid paying bribes without significant impact on business operations. 
When public officials maintain some control over firms (through regulation) their 
bargaining power will be reduced and they may end up paying a bribe. Corrupt officials 
will in theory act as perfect price discriminators, extracting the highest possible bribe 
subject to the constraints that they may get caught and that the firm might exit. 
Accordingly, the probability of bribe payment and the amount paid will depend on a 
firm’s ‘ability to pay’ and the outside option if not paying. 
 
                                                 
6 Firms also affect bribe incidence. Firms benefiting the most from services provided by public officials 
will be more likely to offer bribes for easier access to a given service. As mentioned by Clarke and Xu 
(2004) this may lead to public services being allocated according to the value that different enterprises 
place on the particular services, with bribes acting as an efficient discrimination mechanism. 
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Firms differ in several aspects affecting for example profitability and choice of 
technology. These firm characteristics determine a firm’s ability to pay bribes and the 
cost of reallocating its business elsewhere. We therefore proxy firm ability or 
willingness to pay by profits per employee. Firm refusal power/outside option is proxied 
by the K/L ratio since capital is at least partly sunk. Technology with a low sunk cost 
component (low K/L ratio) will strengthen the firm’s bargaining position. Exiting 
becomes more profitable/less costly. As a result, the public official will demand a lower 
bribe. Summary statistics of both variables are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
  Total 2005 2007 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Firm size (log) 1.848 1.077 1.875 1.067 1.820 1.086 
Micro 0.689 0.463 0.677 0.468 0.701 0.458 
Small 0.256 0.437 0.267 0.442 0.246 0.431 
Medium 0.052 0.222 0.055 0.228 0.049 0.215 
Large 0.003 0.055 0.002 0.042 0.004 0.065 
KL ratio (log) 4.193 1.221 4.065 1.205 4.321 1.224 
Profit per employee (log) 2.310 0.866 2.182 0.842 2.437 0.870 
State customer 0.144 0.352 0.144 0.352 0.144 0.352 
State supplier 0.076 0.264 0.075 0.264 0.076 0.265 
Trade 0.058 0.233 0.061 0.240 0.054 0.226 
Government assistance 0.269 0.444 0.295 0.456 0.244 0.430 
Inspections 0.502 0.500 0.448 0.497 0.556 0.497 
Not registered 0.283 0.450 0.261 0.439 0.304 0.460 
Total observations 3322 1661 1661 
Note: Monetary figures are measured in millions real VND.  
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009). 
 
 
As in Svensson (2003) we hypothesize that firm ‘exposure/visibility’ and the degree of 
interaction with public officials will influence bribe incidence. We include two visibility 
proxies: firm size (number of employees), and an indicator variable for not being 
registered officially (informal). Smaller firms and enterprises without a formal business 
registration license can hide more easily from public officials and avoid bribes. 
However, informality may be associated with an opposite effect on bribe incidence. 
Firms may seek informality to avoid paying taxes.7 They will offer the relevant public 
authorities an informal payment to maintain or gain the informal status, as long as the 
benefits from being informal (not paying taxes) exceed the informal payment provided. 
The net effect of not having a business registration license is therefore an empirical 
issue.8 Table 3 provides summary statistics for the two visibility variables associated 
with informal payments. Around 69 per cent of the firms in the cleaned sample are 
categorized as micro, 26 per cent are small, and the remaining 5 per cent are medium-
                                                 
7 Svensson (2003 includes a pay tax dummy as a control rights measure. In our data informality (not 
registered) dominates the pay taxes indicator variable and is therefore excluded in this analysis. 
8 In the data we find that 94 per cent of the firms not paying taxes (491 out of 523 firm observations) do 
not have a business registration license.     
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sized firms. Some 28 per cent of the firms are not registered at the district or provincial 
level, and we actually see a small increase (from 26 to 30 per cent) in the number of 
informal firms between the two surveys. We include as well a series of variables that 
capture the degree to which firms interact directly with public officials with summery 
statistics in Table 3. Hansen et al. (2009) find that having the state sector or a state 
owned-enterprise (SOE) as customer has a positive and well-determined effect on firm 
performance. It may be that benefits are informally divided between the firm and the 
public official responsible for the firm/client contact.  
 
We also include an indicator variable capturing whether SOEs provide the firm with 
intermediate inputs necessary for production. Table 3 shows that 14 per cent of firms 
have the state sector as a customer and only 7 per cent of firms had an SOE as their 
main supplier of inputs. Compared with figures for the 1990s in Hansen et al. (2009) 
this is a remarkable drop. However, this is as expected as state sector influence has 
gradually reduced in Vietnam since the 1990s, including the privatization of SOEs. 
 
As Svensson (2003) we include an indicator variable for foreign trade (import of 
intermediates and/or export of products).9 From Table 2 we have the number of firms 
paying bribes to deal with customs. Combining this information with trade information 
(6 per cent of the sample trade internationally) we estimate that 59 per cent of firms 
engaging in international trade pay bribes. However, only 18 per cent of the trading and 
bribe paying companies pay the bribe to the customs authority. This makes it unclear a 
priori whether it is trade (and interaction with customs) or other firm characteristics of 
traders that increases the probability of providing informal payments. This issue is 
addressed in the results section. 
 
Over the years, promotion of SMEs has been a central policy for the Vietnamese 
government. Government assistance to SMEs can be divided into two sub-groups: (i) 
financial, and (ii) technical assistance. The former includes various forms of investment 
incentives and soft policy loans while the latter basically consists of three types of 
assistance: human resource training, export promotion initiatives, and quality and 
technology programmes.10 While the share of firms receiving assistance from 
government authorities has fallen since the 1990s, Table 3 shows that around 27 per 
cent of firms received some kind of government assistance in 2005-07. This is in line 
with the focus of the Vietnamese government on promoting private sector development, 
but increases the interaction with potentially corrupt public officials. 
 
Besides increasing the interaction between public officials and firms, inspections 
impose a direct administrative cost on the enterprise (time use of management is 
strongly correlated with the number of compliance inspections). Table 3 shows that 
around 50 per cent of enterprises have been inspected, increasing from 45 per cent in 
2005 to 56 per cent in 2007. 
 
                                                 
9 The survey also provides information on the average amount of time used by customs to handle firm 
cargo. Seventy-eight per cent of importing firms report that it takes 0-14 days to handle cargo, whereas 50 
per cent of exporters experience that it takes 14 days or less.  
10 The data provides detailed information on the different kinds of government support. But for the 
purpose of this paper we aggregate the government support information into one indicator variable. For 
details about the effects of government support in Vietnam using these data we refer to Hansen et al. 
(2009). 
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We include three additional explanatory variables, reflecting legal ownership form, 
location and sector, among our determinants.11 The reasons are: 
 
• Household (HH) firms are often less formal than other firm types and subject to 
different legal requirements. Differences in legal structure are therefore a 
potential source of variation in informal payments.12 Legal ownership form is 
modelled using a set of dummy variables which represent the specific legal form 
of the firm (HH, private, collective/partnership, limited liability or joint stock 
enterprise). Appendix Table A shows that 76 per cent of the firms surveyed are 
in the HH category. 
• Nguyen et al. (2007) highlight that Vietnamese provinces are relatively 
autonomous and have implemented centrally planned initiatives with different 
pace and enthusiasm. Consequently, bribe incidence may differ across locations. 
We therefore model location using indicator variables representing each 
province. Some 37 per cent of the firms are located in urban areas (HCMC, Ha 
Noi and Hai Phong).  
• Sector choice influences firms’ relative position on the value-added ladder. This 
may in turn affect the perceived ability to pay bribes. Sector may also capture 
additional aspects of the sunk cost component of physical capital (bargaining 
power) addressed above. On the other hand, relatively specialized and capital 
intensive sectors at the top of the value-added ladder may attract more corrupt 
officials thereby increasing the level of competition among these government 
representatives. The net effect of sector on bribe incidence is therefore 
indeterminate a priori. We include sector dummies (based on 2-digit level ISIC 
codes) to control for sector effects. The three best represented ISIC sectors in 
our sample are: food processing (ISIC 15) (29 per cent), fabricated metal 
products (ISIC 28) (17 per cent), and wood (ISIC 20) (10 per cent). 
3 Econometric Results 
We address three issues in our econometric analysis. First, we investigate the 
determinants of informal payments provided by Vietnamese SMEs. Second, we study 
the association between bribe incidence and informality, and our analysis suggests that 
causality runs from formality to bribes. Third, given the level of bribes paid by SMEs 
and the degree of informality in the private business environment, we are finally 
interested in finding the net effect of informal payments and informality on firm 
performance. 
3.1 Bribe incidence  
We begin by reporting results from a probit model including the potential determinants 
identified above. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table 4 use contemporaneous explanatory 
                                                 
11 Appendix Table A reports summary statistics.  
12 Note that in the case of Vietnam household firms register at the district level, whereas the government 
administrative unit for sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies, joint stock 
companies is at province level. This means that legal ownership form may matter for the type of public 
official the firm potentially has to face.  
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measures,13 whereas columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 report results from regressing bribe 
incidence in 2007 on lagged explanatory variables (observations from 2005). The 
following results emerge. First, the time dummy included in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 in 
Table 4 is negative and significant. This indicates that there has been a decrease in the 
probability of paying bribes over time. Second, the ‘exposure/visibility’ variable 
represented by firm size is positive and well-determined in all specifications. Larger 
firms have a higher probability of paying bribes. Third, the estimates of the variables 
representing firms’ ‘ability to pay’ (profit per employee) and the outside options 
captured by the K/L ratio have the expected positive signs although not well-determined 
in all specifications. 
 
Fourth, zooming in on results the reported in columns 5-8 in Table 4, we note that 
adding ‘interaction with government’ controls is important when trying to explain bribe 
incidence.14 In column 5 (not controlling for legal structure, sector and location), we see 
that firms which have the state as customer and firms which are supplied with inputs by 
SOEs face a higher probability of paying bribes. However, only the supplier effect 
remains well-determined controlling for legal structure, sector and location (column 7), 
and in the fixed effects specification in Table 5. And this effect only remains significant 
in specifications regressing bribe incidence on contemporary explanatory variables. 
Fifth, the results in column 5-7 of Table 4 indicate that firms engaged in international 
trade and interacting with customs authorities have a lower probability of paying bribes, 
a result contrary to the conclusion reached by Svensson (2003). However, this effect is 
not well-determined in the specifications using lagged independent variables and in the 
fixed effects specifications in Table 5.15  
 
                                                 
13 We use within survey lagged explanatory variables meaning that bribe incidence in 2005 is regressed 
on explanatory variables reported observed in 2003/4.   
14 The correlation matrix of government interaction controls is provided in Appendix B. 
15 Trading firms are found among the larger enterprises in the sample, and almost none of the micro 
firms import/export directly. Excluding micro-enterprises from the sample results in an insignificant 
coefficient on the ‘trade’ indicator variable in columns 5 and 7 in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Bribe incidence: traditional determinants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm size (log employment) 0.170*** 0.121*** 0.163*** 0.098*** 0.119*** 0.074*** 0.130*** 0.072***
 (20.30) (12.34) (13.46) (7.34) (12.25) (6.28) (10.45) (5.16)
KL ratio (log) 0.049*** 0.018* 0.043*** 0.012 0.032*** 0.003 0.032*** 0.003
 (6.40) (1.82) (5.07) (1.14) (4.27) (0.34) (3.88) (0.26)
Profit/Employee (log) 0.033*** 0.027** 0.035*** 0.017 0.013 0.012 0.025** 0.016
 (3.15) (1.98) (3.06) (1.22) (1.25) (0.87) (2.23) (1.22)
Time dummy -0.167*** -0.171*** -0.161*** -0.171***
 (10.30) (10.09) (9.55) (9.87)
State as customer 0.067*** 0.017 0.039 -0.004
 (2.80) (0.60) (1.60) (0.14)
State as input supplier 0.155*** 0.054 0.133*** 0.044
 (4.74) (1.50) (4.07) (1.21)
Deal with customs (export/import) -0.060* -0.025 -0.077** -0.039
 (1.81) (0.61) (2.29) (1.00)
Received government assistance 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.038* 0.030
 (3.89) (3.55) (1.92) (1.28)
Inspected 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.103*** 0.082***
 (5.58) (4.44) (5.31) (3.51)
Informal/Not registered -0.177*** -0.159*** -0.169*** -0.150***
  (7.66) (5.43) (7.01) (4.93)
Legal structure dummies included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Sector dummies included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Province dummies included No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
No of observations 3,322 1,661 3,322 1,661 3,322 1,661 3,322 1,661
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.26 0.21
Note: Dependent variable: bribe Incidence. Probit estimates, marginal effects. t-values (reported in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 
10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
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Table 5: Bribe incidence: government interaction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  FE FE FE FE 
Firm size (log employment) 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (4.54) (4.51) (4.50) (4.48) 
KL ratio (log) 0.025** 0.023* 0.028** 0.027** 
 (2.13) (1.94) (2.43) (2.25) 
Profit/Employee (log) 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.010 
 (0.87) (0.74) (0.80) (0.66) 
State as customer     0.038 0.037 
   (1.08) (1.04) 
State as input supplier   0.106** 0.099** 
   (2.31) (2.14) 
Deal with customs (export/import)   -0.039 -0.037 
   (0.64) (0.59) 
Received government assistance   0.052** 0.052** 
   (2.18) (2.18) 
Inspected   0.031 0.032 
   (1.24) (1.28) 
Informal/Not registered    -0.086*** -0.087*** 
      (2.80) (2.73) 
Legal structure dummies included No Yes No Yes 
Sector dummies included No Yes No Yes 
Province dummies included No Yes No Yes 
No of observations 3,322 3,322 3,322 3,322 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Note: Dependent variable: bribe Incidence. Linear probability model. t-values (reported in parenthesis) are 
heteroskedasticity robust. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, 
respectively. All estimations included a time dummy. Using a conditional fixed effects logit approach 
(resulting in 1,078 usable observations for analysis) does not change the main result qualitatively (i.e. the 
informal indictor variable remains negatively well-determined in all specifications). Results available upon 
request. 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
 
Sixth, government assistance and bribe incidence are significantly positively associated 
in all specifications (including the fixed effects estimations in Table 5) except for 
column 8. This suggests that the firms are paying informally for the service delivered. 
Seventh, inspections and informal payments seem to go hand in hand. Firms which are 
inspected by public officials have an 8 to 10 per cent higher probability of paying bribes 
than non-inspected firms. This result is well-determined in all OLS specifications. 
However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in Table 5 the impact of inspections 
on bribe incidence disappears. Finally, informality is negatively associated with bribe 
incidence in all specifications in Tables 4 and 5. This is contrary to the result obtained 
by Tenev et al. (2003) for Vietnam, but in line with the hypothesis that hiding (and not 
interacting with corrupt public officials) is easier when the firm has informal status.   
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Table 6: Bribes and informality 
 
Panel A: All observations 
    Informal  
    No Yes Total 
P
ay
 B
rib
es
 No 
1,444 (62) 879 (38) 2,323 
(61)  (94)  (70) 
Yes 
939 (94) 60 (6) 999 
(39)  (6)  (30) 
  Total 2,383 (72) 939 (28) 3,322 
 
Panel B: Only 2005 
    Informal  
    No Yes Total 
P
ay
 B
rib
es
 No 
654 (62) 394 (38) 1,048 
(53)  (91)  (63) 
Yes 
573 (93) 40 (7) 613 
(47)  (9)  (37) 
  Total 1,227 (74) 434 (26) 1,661 
 
Panel C: Only 2007 
    Informal  
    No Yes Total 
P
ay
 B
rib
es
 No 
790 (62) 485 (38) 1,275 
(68)  (96)  (77) 
Yes 
366 (95) 20 (5) 386 
(32)  (4)  (23) 
  Total 1,156 (70) 505 (30) 1,661 
Note: Number of enterprises (percentage in parenthesis). 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
 
Given the strong association between bribe incidence and informality we dig further 
into this relationship. Detailed bribe/informality tabulations by year are shown in 
Table 6. In panel A (both surveys pooled) we see that only 60 (6 per cent) out of the 999 
enterprises which pay bribes are informal. This confirms that the probability of paying 
bribes is relatively low when a  firm is informal. Generally the costs of becoming formal 
are increased exposure to taxes and a significantly higher probability of having to pay 
bribes.  
 
Although we control for profits per employee in all specifications, it is possible that 
poorly performing firms move from formality to informality to avoid taxes and due to 
lower ‘ability to pay’ are ‘exempted’ from the bribe payment even though they are 
known to the bribe system. Table 7A maps the 573 formal firms which paid bribes in 
2005 and shows how changes in formality are associated with changes in bribe 
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incidence (controlling for levels and/or changes in firm size, K/L ratio and profits per 
employee). 
Table 7A: Bribes and informality 
    DD DD DD 
  Bribes paid in 2005 Bribes paid in 2005 Bribes paid in 2005 
    Formal in 2005 Formal in 2005 Formal in 2005 
Firm size (log 
employment)  Level -0.084***  -0.102*** 
  (4.13)  (4.83) 
 Difference  -0.163*** -0.192*** 
   (3.92) (4.60) 
KL ratio (log) Level 0.038*  0.035 
  (1.75)  (1.42) 
 Difference  -0.051** -0.037 
   (2.37) (1.59) 
Profit/Employee (log) Level -0.036  -0.009 
  (1.46)  (0.28) 
 Difference  0.010 0.020 
   (0.50) (0.76) 
Informal Difference 0.214*** 0.250*** 0.200*** 
  (2.63) (3.27) (2.43) 
No of observations   573 573 573 
Pseudo R2   0.04 0.04 0.08 
Note: Dependent variable: change in bribe incidence conditioned on being formal and paying bribes in 
2005. Probit model, marginal effects. t-values (reported in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at a 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
 
 
Column 1 shows that firms which become informal have a significantly higher 
probability of moving out of the bribe system. As expected, larger firms have a lower 
probability of changing into informality. Surprisingly, we find a positive coefficient on 
the K/L 2005 level on the probability of becoming informal, but this effect is not well-
determined when controlling for differences in the control set (column 3). Finally, the 
level of profit per employee is not well-determined when controlling for size and sunk 
cost. Using the pure double difference specification (column 2 in Table 7A) and the 
double difference specification with level controls (column 3 in Table 7A) we obtain 
more or less the same results. Thus, we reject the above hypothesis that changes in firm 
performance (and ability to pay) are driving the positive association between bribes and 
informality. Table 7B confirms this by focusing on the 394 informal firms not paying 
bribes in 2005. Informal non-bribers in 2005 which became formal in 2007 have a 
significantly higher probability of paying bribes than those remained informal.  
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Table 7B: Bribes and informality 
    DD DD DD 
  No bribes paid in 2005 No bribes paid in 2005 No bribes paid in 2005 
    
Informal/ 
Not registered in 2005 
Informal/ 
Not registered in 2005 
Informal/ 
Not registered in 2005 
Firm size 
(log employment)  Level 0.017**  0.019*** 
  (2.37)  (3.28) 
 Difference  0.006 0.013 
   (0.54) (1.61) 
KL ratio (log) Level 0.003  -0.001 
  (0.39)  (0.21) 
 Difference  -0.003 -0.006 
   (0.53) (1.03) 
Profit/employee 
(log) Level 0.002  0.009 
  (0.19)  (1.10) 
 Difference  0.010 0.012* 
   (0.98) (1.95) 
Formal Difference 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.047*** 
  (3.20) (3.62) (2.86) 
No of observations   394 394 394 
Pseudo R2   0.18 0.14 0.22 
Note: Dependent variable: Change in bribe incidence conditioned on being informal and not paying bribes 
in 2005. Probit model, marginal effects. t-values (reported in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at a 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
 
Finally, reverse causality is a potential issue. Bribes might be paid to become formal 
(paying public officials in the business registration system and paying bribes when 
obtaining a tax code with the tax authorities). However, from the bribe use table 
(Table 2) we note that very few firms pay bribes to obtain licenses and permits. 
Moreover, none of the firms which moved from informal (2005) to formal status (2007), 
which paid bribes in 2007, reported the bribe payment as linked to registration purposes. 
All in all, there seems to be a convincing association between formality and bribe 
payments, with the visibility nature of running a formal business increasing the 
probability of paying bribes. 
3.2 Revenue growth 
We now turn to the association between bribes and informality and subsequent firm 
growth measured as the real revenue growth between 2005 and 2007.16 In all columns 
                                                 
16 We also did the entire analysis using (i) real revenue per employee growth, (ii) real profit per 
employee growth, and (iii) growth in real assets per employee. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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we use the panel dimension of our data and include lagged explanatory variables (2005 
values) and study their effects on real revenue growth.  
Table 8: Firm Growth and bribes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 All All All Bribe05 = 0 Informal05 = 1 Bribe05 = 0 
      Informal05 = 1 
Firm size (log 
employment) lagged -0.055** -0.079*** -0.067*** -0.112*** -0.179*** -0.149** 
 (2.19) (3.13) (2.58) (3.34) (2.92) (2.30) 
Bribes paid in 2005 -0.089**  -0.103**    
 (1.96)  (2.23)    
Informal in 2005  -0.088 -0.107*    
  (1.60) (1.91)    
Bribe change    0.214***  0.147 
    (2.89)  (0.58) 
Informal/formal change     0.347*** 0.340*** 
     (2.94) (2.75) 
Legal structure dummies 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,661 1,661 1,661 1,048 434 394 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.16 
Note: Dependent variable: Real revenue growth between 2005 and 2007. t-values (reported in 
parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 
per cent level, respectively. Time dummies included when relevant. Dividing upon bribe use shows that the 
negative coefficient on bribes is largely driven by bribes paid to gain government contracts and other 
reasons not well specified. 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
 
Column 1 in Table 8 shows a negative association between real revenue growth and 
bribe incidence (controlling for other potential SME revenue growth determinants 
identified in the literature on firm dynamics, see for example Audretsch and Klepper, 
2000). Firms paying bribes in 2005 experienced lower real revenue growth between 
2005 and 2007. Firms paying bribes in 2005 had approximately 9 percentage point 
lower real revenue growth rates than non-bribe paying firms in the sample. The efficient 
grease (or speed-money) hypothesis is therefore rejected in the sample considered. In 
column 2 we consider the effect of informality on firm revenue growth and obtain a 
negative coefficient estimate close to the one found for the bribe indicator variable 
(although not well-determined). Column 3 in Table 8 includes both variables in focus 
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and a negative (and significant) association between bribes/informality and firm revenue 
growth remains.17  
 
Although firms face increasing bribes and tax payments when they become formal (the 
increased visibility effect reported above), column 3 in Table 8 shows that they also 
experience significantly higher revenue growth rates than informal firms. It may 
therefore be beneficial for the firm to obtain a business registration license due to formal 
sector benefits such as (i) increased access to government assistance, (ii) improved 
access to formal credit, (iii) ability to enter into formal contracts (and improved 
enforcement of these contracts), (iv) better access to business services, (v) more 
exposure to potential investors, and (vi) increases in the number of workers considering 
employment in the firm (due to better compliance with the labour law).18 
 
Column 4 in Table 8 only included firms which did not pay bribes in 2005 (the 1,048 
observations documented in both Table 1 and Table 6) and it shows differences in 
growth rates between firms still not providing a bribe in 2007 and firms providing 
bribes in 2007. We observe a significant positive coefficient on the switching indicator. 
This suggests that improved firm performance is positively associated with switching 
from the non-bribe to the bribe paying segment. Considering only formal firms in both 
2005 and 2007 reduces the coefficient estimate to 0.138, and this estimate is only 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Combined with results in columns 1 and 3, we 
interpret these results as a non-rejection of the ‘ability to pay’ hypothesis. Similarly, 
column 5 in Table 8 includes only informal firms in 2005 (434 observations) and it 
reveals the growth effect of becoming formal. We find a large positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the switching indicator variable, suggesting a strong 
association between formalizing the enterprise and firm growth. In column 6 in Table 8 
we include both the bribe and informality switching indicators, and it emerges that the 
formality treatment indicator dominates the bribe switching variable. This means that 
the observed move from the non-bribe segment to paying bribes is typically result of a 
movement out of informality. In this case the performance improvement is driven by the 
change into formality, not by the bribe payment provided.  
 
Finally, in Table 9 we check confirm that the results in Table 8 are not driven by self-
selection of well-performing firms into formality. If so, we would expect indicators of 
firm performance to be good determinants of registration switching (in and out of 
formalization). In Table 9 we use within survey financial accounts (accounting book 
information gathered for 2003, 2004 and 2005) to generate different growth figures for 
2005 and use these measures as determinants of observed 2007 changes in 
registration/formalization.19   
                                                 
17 Coefficient estimates on contemporary bribe incidence are positive and significant in the real revenue 
growth equation, suggesting (in combination with the results in Table 8) that an improvement in a firm’s 
‘ability to pay’ is an important feature of the Vietnamese bribe system.   
18 For example, in the case of government assistance the data show that 30 per cent of registered firms 
were offered assistance as compared to 20 per cent of informal firms. Similar results were found for 
access to credit, however when asked the question ‘are you still in need of a loan’ the majority of ‘yes’ 
answers were among formal firms.   
19 Short-run (within survey) growth in 2005 is defined in terms of (i) revenue, (ii) profits, and (iii) assets, 
and given by log(real X in 2004) minus log(real X 2003), where X=(i), (ii) or (iii). In addition we used the 
within survey average: log[(real X 2005 + real X 2004)/2] - log[(real X 2004 + real X 2003)/2]. This did 
not change the overall results.  
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Table 9: Informality and firm growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Informal05 = 1 Informal05 = 1Informal05 = 1Informal05 = 0Informal05 = 0Informal05 = 0
 Revenue Profits Assets Revenue Profits Assets 
Firm size (log employment) 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.143*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (4.88) (4.77) (4.95) (5.02) (4.91) (5.08) 
Within survey growth 2005 0.097 0.104 0.063 0.000 -0.015 0.000 
 (1.17) (1.54) (0.35) (0.00) (1.02) (0.00) 
Province dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 394 394 394 573 573 573 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Note: Dependent variable: Change in formality between 2005 and 2007. Probit model, marginal effects. t-
values (reported in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations 
 
Columns 1 to 3 focus on informal firms not paying bribes in 2005, and none of the 
within survey growth variables explains firm changes into formal operation very well 
(controlling for firm size and province). Columns 4 to 6 limit the analysis to bribe 
paying formal firms in 2005, and our different growth measures are again not good 
predictors of changing into an informal business structure.   
4 Conclusions 
We started out in this paper analysing the determinants of bribe incidence covering 
1,661 SMEs in Vietnam. We found that firm-level characteristics capturing visibility 
(size and formality), sunk costs and bargaining position (capital/labour ratio), ability to 
pay (profitability), and the level of interaction with public officials (inspections, 
assistance etc.) affect the probability of having to provide a bribe. Formally registered 
firms are more likely to provide informal payments. This leads us to concluding that the 
visibility effect dominates the bribes-to-hide effect. The implication is that the 
government’s push to combat bribes is well justified. 
 
Using the panel dimension of our data we carefully disentangled the causal relationship 
between bribe incidence and formality. Applying a double difference methodology, we 
showed that change in formality strongly influences changes in bribe incidence, even 
when controlling for levels and changes in firm performance. We also found that bribe 
payments and informality have a negative effect on firm performance. Thus, anti-
corruption measures may not only increase formalization, they can also yield direct 
growth effects. Moreover, the firm growth increase after obtaining a business 
registration license on average outweigh the additional bribe cost of becoming formal; 
and our analysis shows that this positive registration effect is not driven by self-
selection of well-performing firms into formality. 
 
In sum, bribes harm firm performance in Vietnam. Registration increases the probability 
of paying bribes, but this effect is outweighed by the positive growth enhancing effect 
of registration. Bribes slow down growth and hampers (but does not prevent) 
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formalization. Overall, anti-corruption measures not only contribute to increasing 
formalization of the economy, but also have the potential of yielding a double dividend 
on firm performance through direct profit effects. 
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Appendix Table A: Summary statistics: legal ownership form, location and sector 
  Total 2005 2007 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Household establishment/business 0.758 0.428 0.764 0.425 0.753 0.432 
Private (Sole proprietorship) 0.083 0.277 0.090 0.287 0.076 0.266 
Partnership/collective/ 
co-operative 0.027 0.163 0.026 0.159 0.029 0.168 
Limited liability company 0.121 0.327 0.111 0.315 0.131 0.338 
Joint stock company 0.010 0.098 0.008 0.091 0.011 0.104 
Ha Noi 0.081 0.272 0.081 0.272 0.081 0.272 
Phu Tho 0.108 0.310 0.108 0.310 0.108 0.310 
Ha Tay 0.172 0.378 0.172 0.378 0.172 0.378 
Hai Phong 0.063 0.243 0.063 0.243 0.063 0.243 
Nghe An 0.153 0.360 0.154 0.361 0.152 0.359 
Quang Nam 0.077 0.266 0.076 0.266 0.077 0.267 
Khanh Hoa 0.036 0.187 0.036 0.187 0.036 0.187 
Lam Dong 0.037 0.188 0.037 0.188 0.037 0.188 
HCMC 0.223 0.416 0.223 0.416 0.223 0.416 
Long An 0.051 0.220 0.051 0.219 0.051 0.220 
Sector 1 0.293 0.455 0.294 0.456 0.293 0.455 
Sector 2 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.069 
Sector 3 0.038 0.191 0.036 0.187 0.040 0.195 
Sector 4 0.030 0.170 0.028 0.166 0.031 0.174 
Sector 5 0.018 0.133 0.016 0.124 0.020 0.142 
Sector 6 0.109 0.311 0.092 0.288 0.126 0.332 
Sector 7 0.024 0.154 0.025 0.155 0.024 0.153 
Sector 8 0.020 0.139 0.020 0.142 0.019 0.135 
Sector 9 0.002 0.046 0.004 0.065 0.000 0.000 
Sector 10 0.014 0.119 0.012 0.109 0.017 0.129 
Sector 11 0.054 0.225 0.054 0.225 0.054 0.225 
Sector 12 0.065 0.247 0.066 0.248 0.064 0.246 
Sector 13 0.008 0.091 0.007 0.085 0.010 0.098 
Sector 14 0.172 0.378 0.173 0.379 0.172 0.377 
Sector 15 0.029 0.168 0.030 0.171 0.028 0.166 
Sector 16 0.006 0.079 0.005 0.069 0.008 0.088 
Sector 17 0.004 0.062 0.005 0.069 0.003 0.055 
Sector 18 0.108 0.311 0.132 0.339 0.084 0.277 
Sector 19 0.002 0.046 0.001 0.025 0.004 0.060 
Total observations 3,322 1,661 1,661 
Note: Sector definitions given below. 
Source: 2005 and 2007 survey data, see CIEM (2007) and CIEM (2009) and own calculations. 
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Sector classifications 
Sector 1 Food products and beverages 
Sector 2 Tobacco products 
Sector 3 Textiles 
Sector 4 Wearing apparel etc. 
Sector 5 Tanning and dressing leather 
Sector 6 Wood and wood products 
Sector 7 Paper and paper products 
Sector 8 Publishing, printing etc. 
Sector 9 Refined petroleum etc. 
Sector 10 Chemical products etc. 
Sector 11 Rubber and plastic products 
Sector 12 Non-metallic mineral products 
Sector 13 Basic metals 
Sector 14 Fabricated metal products 
Sector 15 Electrical machinery, office machinery, computers, radio, TV and other machinery and 
equipment nec. 
Sector 16 Vehicles etc. 
Sector 17 Transport equipment 
Sector 18 Medical and optical equipment, photographic equipment, watches and clocks etc. +  
furniture, jewellery, musical instruments, sports equipment and games and toys 
Sector 19 Recycling 
 
Appendix Table B: Correlation matrix: interaction with government officials 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) State as customer 1.0000      
(2) State as input supplier 0.1417 1.0000     
(3) Deal with customs (export/import) 0.1037 0.0415 1.0000    
(4) Received government assistance 0.0843 0.0600 0.1171 1.0000   
(5) Inspected 0.1252 0.0844 0.1255 0.0433 1.0000  
(6) Not registered  -0.1743 -0.1289 -0.1469 -0.0874 -0.4388 1.0000 
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